Third World nations: Global demands,
local political realities
Bill Geddes
27
November 2009 XPS Version: PDF Version: MOBI Version:
Western people
have, over the past three centuries, confidently applied their own
understandings and forms of organisation to the rest of the world. They have
done this in the sure knowledge that these represent the most advanced,
developed and sophisticated of all forms of understanding and organisation
available to human beings. To introduce those forms to non-Western people has
been to start them on the road to development, short-cutting the historically
long and thorny route taken by Western Europeans in achieving their advanced
state of organisation and understanding.1
Chief
among the forms of organisation thought to be most important in moving into the
modern world, have been the political forms of the industrialised West.
This article examines the processes and consequences
of applying Western political forms to the political realities of
Third World communities.
Amongst
the important influences on governments and people in Third World countries have
been the reification of 'the state' and 'the people' in most discussion of Third
World nations and peoples and the formulation of governmental policies based on
that reification.
This
reorganisation has usually been undertaken as an exercise in 'modernising'
non-Western communities. The modernisation thesis,2 espoused in various forms and with
various emphases by most development specialists over the past fifty years, has
been an optimistic one. It has assumed that, for those nations which genuinely
and consistently implement the necessary social, political and economic changes,
transformation into modem industrialised countries is inevitable. The state has
been assumed to be a self-existent entity, separate from the communities which
it controls, and able to impose necessary changes, however radical, on its
populace. Important responsibilities placed on new nation-states by these
specialists have included establishing those institutions necessary to economic
development, and providing the social and political climate necessary to
stimulate self-interested, competitive material accumulation, leading, it is
assumed, to an inevitable 'take-off into self-sustained economic growth' (cf
Rostow 1961).
Because
most political and economic theorists and practitioners believe that
'traditional' societies are being transformed into modern societies, with
traditional features destined for oblivion, Third World communities have been
regarded as transient. Problems encountered by 'traditionally orientated'
individuals and communities are assumed to be, in large measure, consequences of
this shift to modernity. So, rather than focusing on the social problems of such
communities, one needs to step up the pace of modernisation. Third World
governments, it has been believed 3 should, therefore, in the face of the breakdown of law and order
and social cohesion in traditional communities, more rigorously implement those
measures which will transform them into industrialised communities, with all the
advantages of such a transformation. The dissolution of the old
is a necessary precursor and concomitant of modernisation and the state should
keep its eyes firmly fixed on that goal, not deviating to attend to problems
which are inevitable, but transient consequences of moving toward it. As
Sangmpam says:
...
modernisation theory assumes an imaginary society because the real society in
the Third World is perceived as 'transient' ... Various solutions have been
proposed to combat underdevelopment. Central to these solutions is the role assigned to the state
as the 'engine of development'. Until recently, it was thought that an
authoritarian state could better perform 'developmentalist' tasks. In recent
years, the state has been invested with the capacity to move toward democracy,
which presumably will lead to socioeconomic development. The belief in the state
is reinforced by the call to 'bring-the-state-back-in', according to which the
state and its policies reflect almost autonomous institutions and the actions of
those occupying these institutions. (Sangmpam 1994, p. 1)
This
assumes a 'government' separate from the people it governs, with political
leaders somehow separate from and able to impose their policies on the populace.
All this is based, of course, not only on a reification of 'government' and the
separation of a 'political environment' from other 'environments' such as the
'economic' and the 'social' (see History of the Emergence of Capitalism), but also the
depersonalisation of government and a clear separation between its political and
administrative arms, that is institutional, routinised
Western-style government. As Max Weber (1968) claimed of Western
government, relationships are transformed into objective, instrumental,
depersonalised forms. Politicians are not directly responsible to and identified
with the people they represent and not directly in control of the impersonalised
institutional bureaucracies through which government policies are carried out.
In the
Third World, these presumptions are difficult to sustain. Political activity is
not separate from other forms of activity, and those with political power
exercise it personally. That is, government, both in formulating policy and in
the delivery of services is personalised. And, for people who live in
communities where it is both natural and proper for leaders to be personally
connected with their followers, this personalisation is unexceptional.
Government is not separate from the people, and politicians access the
administrative departments of government through networks of patron-client
relationships which link not only the administrative bureaucracy and
politicians, but also politicians and their constituents.
Inevitably, when such personalised systems of government and
leadership are judged aginst the standards assumed in places where
depersonalised government is the norm, they are found to be 'riddled with
corruption'. In order to conduct business on a 'level playing field',
Western governments and corporations consider it essential to police corrupt
practices. At the instigation of Western nations and agencies the United Nations Convention Against Corruption has been
negotiated, coming into force in 2005. As the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime explains,
Corruption undermines
democratic institutions, slows economic development and contributes to
governmental instability. Corruption attacks the foundation of democratic
institutions by distorting electoral processes, perverting the rule of law and
creating bureaucratic quagmires whose only reason for existing is the soliciting
of bribes. Economic development is stunted because foreign direct investment is
discouraged and small businesses within the country often find it impossible to
overcome the "start-up costs" required because of corruption. (UNODC 2009 -
accessed 26 Nov. 2009)
Unsurprisingly, corruption appears to be endemic in non-Western
nations, but remarkably low in Western nations
4. In order to appreciate
the experiences of Third World nations in the post-Second World War period, we
need to remember that depersonalised government of the Western kind is unusual
and requires understandings of the world which are distinctively Western.5 Where Western understandings
don't exist, the forms of government which they require are also unlikely to
exist; and where people are required to behave as though Western understandings
do exist, there will be many inconsistencies in governmental organisation and
practice.
In the
last twenty years there have been a number of important changes in international
and regional politics around the world. Most obviously, the ideologically fuelled 'Cold War' has ended, with communism and
socialism in disarray and capitalism firmly established in the international
arena. In the world of the 1990s there was a marked increase in
conflicts which were pronounced to be 'ethnically' inspired, in contrast to
those of earlier post-Second World War years, which were usually considered to
be driven by commitment to First and Second World ideologies. This 'ethnic'
focus (which largely took Western countries out of the equation) has,
of course, since 2001, been displaced by a diffuse concern with
'terror', leading to the United States' promoted 'war on terror' around the
world. Non-Western governments, confronted with ethnic challenges inside their
territories, could once again trigger military aid from Western countries
by labelling those with whom they were having difficulty 'separatist
terrrorist organisations' and accusing them of links with 'international
terrorism'. They have been quick to take advantage of Western paranoia,
receiving weaponry and military training from Western countries which
have largely seen them as the 'front line' in the 'war on terror' 6.
There
has also been a technological revolution in worldwide telecommunications
networks, with transactions of all sorts now flowing through those networks
which governments are decreasingly able to effectively monitor and/ or control.
This has been accompanied by a victory for neo-liberal economic reformers 7 as advisers to governments
and international organisations. These advisers have managed to convince
governments everywhere of the need for the privatisation of government assets
and activities and deregulation of financial markets and currencies,
progressively moving control of national fiscal and financial matters from
national governments into the international marketplace. As Rosario
Espinal claimed of Latin America during the 1980s, there was a dramatic
shift away from developmentalism 8 and towards neoliberal economic and political policies:
... pro-market
statements came from different quarters: agencies like the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), foreign governments, a growing number of Latin American
economists and intellectuals and some segments of the business class ... In
addition to pressure from international agencies to privatise and liberalise the
Latin American economies, think tanks and research groups flourished throughout
the region in an effort to publicise neoliberal views. (Espinal 1992, p.
32)
This
coincided with a change in the dominant way of 'making money' in the world -
through currency, bond and stock trading and financial manipulations rather than
through long-term investment in primary and secondary production. This has
resulted in primary production, the most important means of income generation
for new nations, becoming less and less attractive to investors, since returns
on primary production are usually lower and slower - and often far more
uncertain-than those resulting from financial manipulations. So, Third World nations are finding it increasingly difficult to
attract and retain investment income, making their economies increasingly
volatile.
The
volatility of international capital investment, focused on short-term gains,
means that in their efforts to retain investment capital governments must offer
a range of financial inducements, competing with each other to minimise capital
flight. Thus, over time, the cost of investment capital increases for those
countries least able to afford such costs. Far from there being true financial
deregulation, governments find themselves having
constantly to interfere, to prop up their currencies and induce capital to stay.
As Gerald Mier presciently described of the financial crises which assailed
both Latin American and East and South-East Asian countries in the late
1990s (and which, of course, have threatened the rest of the world during the
last years of the first decade of the 21st century):
The Mexican
crisis was caused by the volatility of short term capital flows, produced by the
unfulfilled market expectations of investors. Today capital flows are dominated
by international markets, to the point that domestic autonomy and sovereignty is
subordinated to the markets ... The Mexican crisis or something similar will
happen again because it is impossible to keep exchange rates fixed. (in
MorIes 1996)
Governments, as a result of these influences, are now faced both by
regional and ethnic challenges from within and by new international challenges
to their authority, independence and economic viability. There is a strong
demand for internationalisation of economies, allowing the now dominant forces
of capitalism increasing entry into, and influence over internal economic
activities. This, if and as it is successful, reduces the ability of governments
to control economic activity and therefore to plan and implement economic,
service, and welfare programs. On the one hand, governments are increasingly
finding themselves at the mercy of international financial and fiscal forces,
and on the other, the integrity of the nation-state is being challenged from
within. During the first half of 1996, an unremarkable year for ethnic
conflicts, there were ethnically or religiously inspired revolts in more
than sixty countries around the world. In 2009, though the focus of revolt is
claimed to have changed, the frequency of internal challenges to
central government authority has increased with more and more
non-Western countries teetering on the brink of being declared 'fragile'
or 'failed' states 9.
Nation-states
Many of
the problems of Third World countries seem to centre on attempts to recreate, in
alien environments, Western-style 'nations' and Western-style 'nationalism'
amongst their peoples. In attempting to emulate Western nations, they have
introduced expectations and understandings which appear to fit very poorly into
the cultural understandings and expectations indigenous to their own peoples. To
understand the presumptions and expectations of those responsible for
establishing new nations in the post-War period, we need to understand why they
assumed the viability of such nation-states, and why they presumed that strong
national sentiments amongst the people incorporated in such states would
automatically follow the establishment of new nations. We also need to
understand the nature of the political expectations and presumptions of the
populations which have, in large measure, shaped the post-War experience of
Third World nations.
A growing chorus of Third World writers has insisted on the
inappropriateness of such presumptions for the government of postcolonial
countries. Julius Ihonvbere is one of the clearest of such voices, claiming
that:
... the masses
in Africa, relate to the state as an exploitative, coercive and alien structure
[whose] custodians lack credibility and legitimacy and are thus incapable of
mobilising or leading the people. (Ihonvbere 1994, p. 43)
More
recently, Kamilu Fage has claimed of Nigeria (See Geddes 1997 for a
historical account of the problems of post-colonial Nigeria),
... Nigerian
experience leaves much to be desired. After several attempts at democratization
(involving constitutional reforms, elections etc), the country is yet to evolve
a viable, virile and stable democracy that will elicit popular support and or
even have direct bearing on the lives of the generality of the ordinary
people... the subtle re-emergence of the ugly signs of the past (violence,
bickering and fracas in the state and national assemblies, feuds between the
executive and legislative arms of the government, electoral malpractices,
corruption, oppression etc) raise the fear that Nigerian democracy is till on
shaky grounds. (Fage 2007)
To what
extent are such assertions true of Third World nation-states and governments?
Over the
past three hundred years, the world has experienced widespread, drastic
political reorganisation. Ethnic communities which had been self-governing,
became incorporated into larger self-governing territories. These new political
entities, nation-states, claimed legitimacy as representative of the people they
governed. People in the incorporated communities were presumed to be not only
able, but willing to subordinate ethnic and regional interests and requirements
to the interests and requirements of the larger political whole within which
they were placed. The nation-state was presumed to be comprised of citizens who,
first and foremost, identified with the nation rather than with regions within
the nation: they saw the nation's achievements as their own; the nation's
problems as personal problems; and they so committed themselves to the nation
that when it became threatened, if necessary, they were prepared to die for it.
This
nation-state reorganisation started in Western Europe in the late eighteenth
century and spread outwards over the next two hundred years to engulf the rest
of the world. To understand the political problems faced by Third World nations
in the second-half of the twentieth century, we need to understand the ways in
which their reorganisation into nation states over the past sixty years has
differed from that of Western European nation-states during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries.
An
important feature of Western European nationhood has been the 'nationalism' of
its people, their apparent identification with the nation-state and its
political and bureaucratic organisations, and acceptance of the state's
directive legitimacy. Because most Third World national governments have great
difficulty in gaining and maintaining acceptance from their populations, we need
to understand how European nation-states attained and maintain legitimacy.
During
the latter half of the eighteenth century and during the nineteenth century, the
populations of Western Europe became reorganised into 'nations',10 based on various forms of
representative government, and expanding to include ethnic communities which, in
previous centuries, had been considered politically separate from one another.
As Elie Kedourie says, 'nationalism is a doctrine
invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century' (1993, p. 1). By
the nineteenth century, as Hobsbawm (1990) shows, Western Europeans had become
convinced that the aggregation of small ethnic groupings into large
nation-states was an evolutionary inevitability. As List (1885)
explained:
A large population, and an
extensive territory endowed with manifold national resources, are
essential requirements of the normal nationality; they are the fundamental
conditions of mental cultivation as well as of material development and
political power. A nation restricted in the number of its population and
in territory, especially if it has a separate language, can only possess a
crippled literature, crippled institutions for promoting art and science.
A small State can never bring to complete perfection within its territory
the various branches of production. In it all protection becomes mere private
monopoly. Only through alliances with more powerful nations, by partly
sacrificing the advantages of nationality, and by excessive energy, can it
maintain with difficulty its independence.
(Chapter 15)
As
Hobsbawm says, for Western Europeans, 'nations were therefore, as it were, in
tune with historical evolution only insofar as they extended the scale of human
society, other things being equal' (1990, p. 33). To quote J.S. Mill:
Nobody can suppose that it is
not more beneficial for a Breton or a Basque of French Navarre to be ... a
member of the French nationality, admitted on equal terms to all the privileges
of French citizenship ... than to sulk on his own rocks, the half-savage relic
of past times, revolving in his own little mental orbit, without participation
or interest in the general movement of the world. The same remark applies to the
Welshman or the Scottish highlander as members of the British nation.
(cited in Hobsbawm 1990, p.
34)
Hobsbawm
argues that the minorities incorporated into the expanding nation-states of
Western Europe accepted their incorporation as both positive and inevitable:
... small nationalities or
even nation-states which accepted their integration into the larger nation as
something positive-or, if one prefers, which accepted the laws of progress-did
not recognise any irreconcilable differences between micro-culture and
macro-culture either, or were even reconciled to the loss of what could not be
adapted to the modern age.
(1990, p. 35)
Western
Europeans, convinced that the social, economic, and political world was evolving
towards ever increasing size and complexity,11
accepted that small ethnic communities must,
inevitably, be absorbed into larger political
structures, into nation-states. Those states, it was believed, should be of
sufficient territory, population and resources to enable involvement in the
emerging international forms of trade and diplomacy developing amongst Western
European nation-states and between them and the United States of America. And,
as ethnic and regional communities became incorporated, they inherited the
rights of 'citizens' within the nation-state, so that the government could
legitimately claim to represent them, as it did all other people who lived
within its territory.
While
the nation-state emerged during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in
Western Europe, 'nationalism' (the identification of oneself with others of the
same 'nation', or 'community') has a far longer history. In the 'Middle Ages'
the term 'nation' referred to groups of people, or coalitions of organisations
which came from the same territorial region or district of Europe (Hobsbawm
1990, p. 16). 'Nations' of scholars existed at university centres, each nation
comprised of people from a particular geographical/ecclesiastical area who
supported one another, provided hospitality and security to visitors and new
arrivals, and whose members maintained their links after graduating and moving
to other places. Similarly, nations of merchants and traders existed, which
shared identity with scholars and others identified as belonging to the same
region as themselves.
The medieval use of the term 'nation', following the western
European Orthodox Church's lead, referred to enclaves of people from
the same region, to 'foreigners' and 'sojourners' in other regions of Europe.
More emphasis was given to 'region of origin' than to 'ethnic identity' so that
nations could consist of people who spoke different dialects or languages (the
lingua franca was, of course, Latin), were of different ethnic
ancestry, and possibly of very different skin shadings. Over time, the scope of
such 'nations' became extended, to include, in loose usage, people from fairly
extensive geographical/ecclesiastical regions, having a range of interests,
though the principle of mutual support and acceptance remained important in
claiming membership of a nation. Not until the nineteenth century did the term
come to include both the people of a particular territory, and the political and
bureaucratic state organisation of that territory. When it did, this usually
resulted from concerted political and/ or revolutionary action involving those
who already saw themselves as belonging to the same nation.12
So, in
most Western European territories, the sense of national identity, of mutual
support and co-operation, long preceded the recognition of the 'nation-state' as
a political and bureaucratic organisation which represented the interests of
people who belonged to the nation. It was not that a government was established
which claimed authority within a territory, and that people who did not already
identify themselves as belonging to a common nation were required to swear
allegiance to it. Rather, nationalism preceded the nation-state, which received
its legitimation from the already interconnected people of the territory.
Representative government came from national
revolution and the establishment of governments which represented the interests
of those involved in the revolution.13
As such,
the nations of Western Europe could include a range of ethnic and regional
communities which saw their interests as coinciding with, or complementing those
of the groups with which they identified in national government. National
government could act in the interests of the whole territory, assuming support
from the 'responsible' people in its various regions (see History of the Emergence of Capitalism). And those people who
saw the government as representing their interests, saw, in a truly Hobbesian
sense, their interests as coinciding with the interests of the government. They
could feel a sense of personal fulfilment in its achievements, and a sense of
personal difficulty in its difficulties.
Western
European nation-states during the nineteenth century expanded into the rest of
the world. Wherever they went they extended their political authority through
the establishment of protectorates and colonies. As they did in Europe, so they
did in the rest of the world. They focused on territory, and assumed
the integration of the people within the boundaries of the territories they
controlled. Most colonial authorities established administrative machinery
throughout their territories and assumed its acceptance by the people who
inhabited the governed regions 14. The colonial administrations became the
governments of colonial territories. In doing so, they, in the eyes of most
colonial authorities, were involved in the historical evolution of those
territories, through linking them into world-wide political and economic
networks. It was believed that, given the evolutionary process of constantly
increasing size and complexity, colonised populations could only benefit from
the establishment of colonial administration and reorganisation of their
communities.
Following the Second World War, Western imperial powers, with
varying degrees of reluctance, moved out of their colonies. As they did so, they
created 'new nations', with responsibility for government usually inherited by
Western-educated elites. Their training, based on Western European
understandings of the world, led them to believe that Western forms of political
and administrative organisation were essential to the ongoing well-being of
their people. Because most European commentators simply assumed that where there
was a nation-state one would soon find an emerging sense of nationalism, the
viability of the nation-state was assumed and political failure could only
result from political and economic ineptitude and/ or from a failure to provide
properly representative government. The subsequent histories of postcolonial
states, in large part, reflect attempts to adapt Western nation-state
organisation to their territorial and ethnic realities.
International forces
From
1945 to 1990, postcolonial nations were subjected to a forty-five year period of
'cold war' between the two 'superpowers' which emerged from the Second World
War. Both superpowers held contradictory, but nonetheless equally Western
ideologies which they each attempted to impose on the rest of the world. This,
in turn, split the world into three camps: those who supported capitalism and
saw in Marxism, communism and socialism the anti-Christ which denied individual
human rights and enslaved subjects to the state; those who saw in capitalism the
rapacious greed of a few, subjecting the many to work for their individual and
private gain; and a third, 'non-aligned' group, with many shadings, which sought
to remain neutral, claiming to hold neither ideology, but some other political
rationale suitable to their particular circumstances. It was in reference to
this 'non-aligned' movement that the term 'Third World' first emerged.
As new Third World nations
emerged from the late 1940s onwards, confronted by enormous political and
economic problems, the industrialised world became increasingly aware of the
need to 'develop' 'undeveloped', 'under developed' and 'less developed' regions.
It was strongly believed in 'Third World Development' circles, that, unless
Third World communities were 'developed', they would fall prey to Soviet
propaganda. Over the next forty years, a wide range of national, international
and voluntary development organisations were established. Chief amongst these
have been international organisations with charters which require them to fund
and organise Third World development programs and plans.
The
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have had responsibility for
advising governments on economic, welfare and development matters, for funding
major projects, and for overseeing economic development in the new nations. In
the process, they have widely been accused of imposing their own priorities and
ideological interests on those governments most in need of assistance. As Fantu
Cheru claims:
In the words of former
President Nyerere of Tanzania, the IMF has become 'the International Ministry of
Finance', with enormous leverage to dictate the national policies of Third World
governments ... As in the case of IMF loans, the [World] Bank grants credit only
after a borrower-government signs a letter of intent in which it undertakes to
comply with certain conditions. These conditions, however, go beyond the
traditional IMF recipe and require major institutional reforms ... The critics
of the IMF and the World Bank charge that these institutions represent the
interests of Western countries and that their orthodox prescriptions are not
appropriate to the circumstances of African countries as they fail to address
the root causes of underdevelopment and unequal exchange.
(Cheru 1989, pp. 35-6, 38-9)
The
United Nations has provided a forum for interchanges between developed and
developing countries. It has also often been accused of being a vehicle for the
imposition of First World demands on Third World governments, including the
imposition of sets of 'universal principles' relating to the rights of
individuals and the responsibilities of governments. Following the Second World
War, with the ideological confrontation of capitalism and communism, Western
nations became increasingly concerned with 'human rights', particularly with the
right of individuals to freedom of movement and self-expression. No government
should have the right to control movement. The United Nations International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights spelt this out clearly. Western nations,
seeing this as a crucial distinction between themselves and those aligned
with the Eastern Bloc, put pressure on Third World governments to comply with
the United Nations covenants, which, over the years,
have consistently addressed current social, political and economic concerns of
First World countries. Article 12 of the above Covenant reads:
1. Everyone lawfully within
the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty
of movement and freedom to choose his [sic] residence.
2. Everyone shall be free to
leave any country, including his own.
3. The
above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those
which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public
order. .. public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are
consistent with the other rights recognised in the present Covenant.
15
[UN 1976]
Not only
were Third World governments pressured to implement such resolutions, a range of
United Nations organisations (formed to provide development assistance)16 provided means of leverage to donor countries.
Where
First World governments disapproved of political processes and developments
within the new nations, they very often used these international organisations
as forums within which they could voice their concerns and through which they
could pressure Third World governments for reform. An accusation made against
the activities of many of these organisations has been that the priorities which
have been set, and the programs and projects which have been funded, have
reflected First World rather than Third World concerns; that these programs and
the activities of international organisations have very often been motivated by
'human rights' issues which reflect the political concerns of First World
nations. As the Indonesian Government retorted in response to such pressures:
Human rights questions are
essentially ethical and moral in nature. Hence, any approach to human rights
questions which is not motivated by a sincere desire to protect these rights but
by disguised political purposes or, worse, to serve as a pretext to wage a
political campaign against another country, cannot be justified.
(Alatas 1993)
Given
the international tensions of the period, it is small wonder that the
international political concerns of donor nations strongly influenced their
development priorities and led them to use development funding as a means of pressuring governments into endorsing their interests and
concerns. Much of the pressure exerted on postcolonial governments was
concerned, not with the material well-being of Third World peoples so much as
with ensuring the commitment of governments and people to the ideological biases
of the donor nations.
With the
demise of the Soviet Union, 'non-alignment' has become anachronistic. Now there
is only one highly successful and very dominant ideology (with its variants) in
the West, with socialism and communism in disrepute. Those who, in the past,
sought to remain nonaligned, now have little option but to accept the ascendancy
of capitalism and attempt to reorganise their communities to participate in the
rapidly expanding international capitalist system. Many of them, in the 1980s
and 1990s, have, at World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF)
instigation, implemented structural adjustment programs (SAPs) to reorientate
their political and economic organisation and activity to neoliberal,
free-market requirements. In the new international climate, no nation can escape
involvement in the emerging global communications, financial, enterprise,
information and entertainment networks. Nor can they insulate themselves from
the deregulative forces which are exposing populations to the vagaries of the
international marketplace and giving transnational corporations and
organisations increasing influence within national boundaries.
As
colonial territories gained independence, they entered a world threatened by the
confrontation of two world industrial powers, armed with weapons of mass
destruction. No country was immune from the resulting tensions and from the
demands made upon them to support or oppose the Western and Eastern blocs. While
there was no Third World War during this period, there were innumerable 'brush
fires' or small wars funded by the major world players and their allies, as
superpower tensions spilt over into the rest of the
world, reclassifying local disputes in Cold War terms.
During
the Cold War period, these wars were fought in colonial and postcolonial
countries, with opponents armed and supported by the two superpowers or their
allies, and each conflict recast as an ideological confrontation between
capitalism and communism. Ironically, because the superpowers and their allies
were only directly involved in three of these wars, which were all fought on
Third World soil, this period of worldwide turmoil and bloodshed has often been
described by people in Western nations as a prolonged period of peace, and that
peace has usually been attributed to the balanced build-up of nuclear weapons,
which guaranteed the 'mutually assured destruction' (with the appropriate
acronym 'MAD') of the two superpowers should they enter into war with each
other. But during this period millions of people were killed in wars which were
bankrolled and armed by the superpowers and their allies in the name of the
ideological confrontation of capitalism and communism.17
This was
not a period when newly independent countries could concentrate on their
'development' equitably aided by 'developed' nations and development
organisations whose interests in their affairs were wholly benign and positive.
This was a period when countries which wished to receive 'aid' from the
'developed' 'First' (capitalist) or 'Second' (communist) worlds had to
demonstrate their ideological commitment to the bloc which provided the
aid.18 It was a period in which the bloc which did not provide the aid
almost certainly attempted to develop and/or maintain festering discontent and
rebellion within the country, hoping, through successfully fuelling
insurrection, to replace the leadership with people committed to its ideology.
Throughout the Third World, governments, faced with the enormous task (inherited
from colonial powers) of developing the infrastructures of 'modern'
'industrialised' countries, found themselves fighting 'insurgents' or 'rebels'
or 'guerrilla movements', spending a great deal of their time, energy and
resources on these conflicts. Kick and Kiefer claimed that:
In the last few years,
developing countries have spent nearly [US] $20 billion per annum on the
importation of armaments ... militarisation of the Third World coincides with a
marked post-war change in the global theatres of war from the developed to the
developing countries. In the first half of this century major wars involved
direct contention between the prevailing world powers, but since 1945 the
structure of international warfare has shifted. Sivard (1982) identifies 65
major wars and 10,700,000 civilian and battle deaths during 1960-1982, and with
only two exceptions (Northern Ireland and Turkey) these wars were entirely
fought on the territory of developing countries ... The rivalry between the
capitalist and eastern socialist power blocs has ...
been played out in the Third World by the provision of military equipment to
local combatants, and less often by direct intervention either by the sponsors
themselves or by their proxies.
(Kick & Kiefer 1987, pp.
34, 44)
As
Michael Renner described, 'more than $1.2 trillion worth of military equipment
has been transferred [to Third World countries] during the past three decades'
(1994, p.23).19 It was small wonder that 'development'
activities were less than successful, and that governments, by the 1980s, faced
bankruptcy and economic ruin. Dan Connell spelt out some of the consequences:
In 1991, of the 25 largest
Third World debtors, 12 were at war, and many were on a war footing ... From
1970 to 1989, according to UN reports, Third World debt skyrocketed from $68.4
billion to $1,262.8 billion, leaving several nations owing more than they
produce in annual income. Today, many countries have been forced to restructure
their economies to keep up interest payments, while living standards plunge,
urban squalor and rural poverty deepen, and infant and maternal mortality rates
climb toward pre-independence levels. With the best land reserved for export
crops and natural resources sold off at discount rates, their ability to feed
themselves declines further while environmental degradation proceeds apace. And
more money is borrowed to stave off imminent catastrophe.
(Connell 1993, p. 1)
As James
Speth, Administrator of the United Nations Development Program, has said of
Africa:
We conveniently forget
Africa's history. We forget that the transatlantic slave trade robbed Africa of
about 12 million of its able-bodied men and women. We forget that colonialism
which followed the slave trade introduced a system of exploitation of Africa's
natural resources to feed the industries of the West. We forget the 1884/1885
Colonial Conferences of Berlin which crudely Balkanised and divided Africa into
geographic areas of control by the West, with scant regard for ethnic groupings.
We even forget that during the period of the cold war's geopolitical fight for
spheres of influence, Africa became a focal point for the ideology and the arms
that today contribute to the havoc we find in Rwanda and Burundi, in Zaire and
Angola and Somalia ... Conflict and wars claim resources that would otherwise be
spent on education and health and housing and other areas of development. ... A
large part of the blame for this trading in death rests with the industrial countries who, while giving aid in the
order of $60 billion a year, earn much more in arms sales and otherwise from the
estimated $125 billion per year in military expenditures of the developing
world.
(Speth 1994)
At the
very time when postcolonial governments were attempting to establish viable
political and administrative institutions in their countries, legitimised by
popular acceptance and participation, they were required to develop
sophisticated international policies and interactions, balancing the demands of
the superpowers with sets of demands being placed upon them by an emerging set
of international institutions. The conflicting and contradictory demands to
which Third World governments were subjected made long-term, rational planning
very difficult.
Problems of nation-building
The
'nations' created by colonial powers usually directly reflected the geographical
territories which they had ruled. They usually incorporated a variety
of ethnic groupings, sometimes traditionally opposed to one another, sometimes
more closely tied to other communities not included within the national
boundaries, and sometimes opposed through the activities of the colonial powers
themselves 20.
As we
have seen, the sense of incorporating, co-operative identity amongst a
territorial population preceded the establishment of most Western European
nation-states. The nationalism of most Third World nations, on the contrary,
consisted in the desire of educated minorities to take over the reins of
government from colonial administrators, coupled with a strong desire on the
part of the populace to be freed from foreign domination. In most new nations,
the nation-state preceded the emergence of nationalism amongst the vast majority
of the population. Those who inherited government, inherited a responsibility
which few colonial administrations had accepted - they would have to find ways
in which to develop and maintain a sense of nationalism amongst the diverse
peoples of their national territories.
The
unity of a colony was, to the colonial power, a consequence of its
administration, and did not require the active endorsement of the indigenous
populations. The postcolonial nation-state, however, as a result of very strong international pressures and a presumption of the
universal applicability of Western democratic forms, needed to receive its
legitimation from the population. Postcolonial governments, unlike the colonial
administrations which preceded them, needed to be ratified by public
identification with them as legitimate and unifying authorities within national
territories. Whereas colonial powers had provided administration, and
administrative representatives down to the local village and household levels in
the form of magistrates, police, wardens, and council officers, but had not
needed to require the commitment of villagers to their supervision, postcolonial
governments needed to engender in their populations a sense of 'belonging' to
the nation, rather than to a particular region, ethnic group or clan.
Governments, therefore, had to intrude into the lives of their constituents in
ways not contemplated by most colonial authorities. As Bice Maiguashca has said:
As for the Third World,
during the 1950s and 1960s most of the newly created states concentrated their
attention on establishing political centralisation and fostering national
integration. As a consequence, most indigenous peoples, who had enjoyed a
relative degree of autonomy during the colonial period, now found themselves
under the authority of local elites who were driven by the imperative of
'nation-building' and who sought to consolidate their precarious hold on power
through any means available to them ...
(Maiguashca 1994, p. 361)
National
governments, handed control by colonial authorities, had to intrude into the
identities and self-definitions of relatively insular regions, ethnic groups and
clans, attempting to inculcate new perceptions and understandings, through which
people would primarily define themselves as members of the nation, so as to weld
them into a coherent whole. They had to begin 'nation-building' in a way not
confronted by their colonial predecessors. While those who inherited the reins
of governmental power usually conceived of their task as one of establishing a
European-style 'nation-state',21
the motives for support by the
majority of the population usually had less to do with the establishment of a
nation-state than with the displacement of those who had imposed such ideas upon
them. This new, and often very intrusive, involvement of national political and
governmental activity in local and regional affairs created mounting tension in
many regions. In many countries the resentment generated by such intrusion led
to independence claims by regions and ethnic groups.
Most
colonial authorities, aware of the strong divisive forces which existed within
the territories they were handing over to indigenous elites, counselled new
governments to devolve political and administrative authority to regions. This
decentralisation of political and governmental organisation and activity, it was hoped, would dampen demands for
secession from the new nation. Conventional wisdom in political and economic
development circles also held that, in order to ensure grassroots involvement in
political and economic development, it was necessary to involve people as
directly as possible in the responsibilities of government. Premdas and Steeves
(1984) spelt out the rationale clearly:
If decolonisation means
anything, it would at least entail the dismantling and re-orienting of the
inherited bureaucracy rendering government administrative behaviour subservient
to community will. In essence, decolonisation at the grassroots becomes more of
a reality where decision making and execution do not remain the monopoly or
preserve of civil servants but rather are controlled by elected local councils.
The overdeveloped centre must be deconcentrated to the periphery; a meaningful
measure of autonomy in political decision making should be devolved to the vast
majority of citizens who are rural dwellers ...
(Premdas & Steeves 1984,
p. 2)
However,
the problems confronting new nations could not be so easily overcome. In most
countries, devolution of governmental responsibilities to provincial and
regional governments simply multiplied the problems associated with governing
through poorly legitimised political structures. A further level of inefficient,
ineffective bureaucracy and political office was added to a structure which was
quickly to come under real strain (see Geddes 1997 for illustration of this).
Further, once regions gained political voice of their own, it became easier for
regional interests to argue for secession, centred on the existing political and
bureaucratic structures. Many post-independence separation movements focused
their rebellions through taking control of provincial and regional governments
in their areas.
Postcolonial governments faced challenges to their autonomy
from several directions: international organisations and major
international political powers placed strong demands on them to accept and act
on their priorities and interests; the deregulation demanded by those involved
in the emerging international economic order made governments less and less able
to control economic and welfare activity within their territories; and regional
forces challenged the legitimacy of the nation-state. Benjamin Barber and Regine
Temam (1992) claimed that internationalisation and tribalism in the 1990s were
still, and perhaps even more successfully, undermining the traditional political
institutions of the nation-state. On the one hand, global economic and
ecological forces were requiring increasing integration and uniformity in the
world, with deregulation making national borders permeable. On the other hand,
nations were being threatened by 'resurgent,
conflicting nationalities and tribal enmities' (Barber & Temam 1992, p. 13).
The
leadership and internal organisation of regional and ethnic groups and clans
incorporated within the new nations had very often been warped, disrupted and
weakened during the colonial period. Those who sought power in the new nations
found in those groups fertile soil for their own ambitions. They often attempted
to subvert and/ or displace 'traditional' leadership in order to establish
personal support-bases within their own ethnic and regional communities through
which they could gain control of the national government (see Nnoli 1980, p.
218ff for a discussion of such activities within Nigeria). As Ikejiani described
of Nigeria in 1964:
It is glaringly evident that
the distinguishing mark in Nigerian public life presently is not a man's
political philosophy, or religion, or party, or education, or wealth, or
personal qualities, but in the last analysis his tribe or origin. Nigerians
carry these tribal thoughts into all aspects of their daily life. They carry
them into their friendships, into their occupations, into their loyalties and
into their prejudices. Politics in Nigeria not only has a regional cleavage,
subtle and most grossly evident, but also clan connotation. There is a deep
struggle for tribal superiority as well ... It is certainly beyond dispute that
in our factories and shops, in government offices, in corporations and in our
various institutions, appointments and promotions are made, in many cases, on
tribal and clan calculations.
(Ikejiani 1964, p. 122)
Rather
than a shared 'nationalism' amongst the populace, the governors of new nations
found that colonial administration had done little to weaken ethnic and clan
loyalties and identities. It had been just as ineffective in establishing any
sense of shared identity between the disparate communities within national
territorial boundaries. Most people interacted with the colonial structures at
the local level and seldom needed to think in terms of an over arching
'national' bureaucracy. In consequence, for most people, pre-colonial political
allegiances, while distorted by colonial experience, were still potent. As
Chukwudum Okolo suggested:
Perhaps the best description
of the African reality is tribalism, which is Africa's foremost social evil.
Tribal wars have long been part of the continent's chequered history, and a
source of social, political, and economic distress since independence. The
identifiable cause of coups in Africa lies in tribal struggles for power.
(Okolo 1989, p. 33)
During
the 1990s, with Third world governments now assumed to be firmly in control of
their national territories, an international emphasis emerged on minorities, on
'the Fourth World' or 'Indigenous Nations' (see Hughes 1997). As the Draft
International Covenant on the Rights of Indigenous Nations, presented to the
Geneva headquarters of the United Nations in 1994 by
the Centre for World Indigenous Studies, USA, spelt out.
Paradoxically, as emphasis was increasingly placed on the
globalisation of economies and the emergence of supra-national political, social
and economic integration, the rights of minority groups within national
boundaries were increasingly emphasised in international debate.
Representatives of such groups found receptive audiences in international
forums and in First World nations in pressing claims for the recognition
of:
... the urgent
need to respect and promote the inherent rights and characteristics of
Indigenous Nations, especially the right to lands, territories and resources,
which derive from each Nation's culture; aspects of which include spiritual
traditions, histories and philosophies, as well as political, economic and
social customs and structures. (UN 1994a)
While
continuing to treat the state as separate from and able to direct the activities
of 'its people', international organisations and First World leaders
increasingly required Third World governments to recognise the rights of
minorities within their boundaries. As the Draft Covenant cited above said:
Indigenous
Nations have the right of self-determination, in accordance with international
law, and by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development without
external interference; ... Indigenous Nations may freely choose to participate
fully in the political, economic, social and cultural life of a State while
maintaining their distinct political, economic, social and cultural
characteristics, and not relinquishing the inherent right of
sovereignty.
(UN
1994b)
In part,
these apparently contradictory emphases signalled the decreasing importance
being placed upon nation-states in the world of the late 1990s. In part,
however, the emphasis on the rights of minorities also reflected the realities
of the ethnic conflict which has been present in Third World nations since their
inception, and which was becoming a major concern in the First World. As a 1995
FAO report described:
More and more
small states are emerging, requiring new forms of extra-national arrangements
and development assistance. Conflicts such as those in Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Chechnya are recent and dramatic manifestations of an emergent nationalism that
created new, and exacerbated old,
political, economic, religious, and ethnic problems. Violence and war have
continued unabated in various parts of the developing world.
(UN
1996)
So,
Third World nations were being challenged by forces both inside and outside
state boundaries. Yet, most governments were as committed as ever to
implementing the modernisation agenda of the past forty years, with
modifications to fit the growing emphasis on neoliberal governmental
'downsizing' and reliance on 'market forces'.
Since
September 11th 2001, with the West re-oriented to seeking out and destroying
'terrorists' wherever they might be found (or imagined!), those minorities which
have not already secured rights (and many who have) find themselves categorised
as 'terrorists' by central governments. A new language has emerged to legitimise
harsh reaction to minority demands. Branding a minority movement
a 'separatist terrorist organisation' seems to mute condemnation of any
action against them from most Western governments. Adopting the policies
and justificatory language of George W. Bush's United States, central
governments have readily asserted, in the words of Henry Hyde, Chairman of the
US House of Representatives Committee on International Relations (2001),
that:
We must be
prepared not only to protect ourselves from new assaults, not only to intercept
and frustrate them, but to eliminate new threats at their source. This must be a
permanent campaign, similar to the ancient one humanity has waged against
disease and its never-ending assault upon our defenses (Hyde
2001)
With
Western governments committed to similar reaction to those who oppose them
around the world, it has become increasingly difficult for disadvantaged
minorities to gain support or even a hearing in international forums.
Movements which were supported during the 1990s are now cut adrift, to fend for
themselves. The consequences can be seen in the increasing flows of displaced
persons, no longer welcome in Western countries which now see them - whatever
their age or gender - as a looming threat to national
security.
So, from
the outset, most Third World governments have had to contend with the competing
interests of powerful ethnic and regional groups, more intent on furthering
their own interests than in ensuring workable national government. This, in many
countries, has led to long-term civil unrest, insurrection, and civil war. In
the climate of the Cold War, such difficulties were compounded by international
powers confounding tribal, regional and clan conflict with ideological
confrontation between capitalism and communism. The protagonists were,
therefore, often armed and funded by competing international forces. In the
post-Cold War period, the flow of arms did not diminish. With huge
stockpiles of weapons no longer required by Western and Eastern bloc countries,
arms merchants were able to offer sophisticated weaponry at bargain basement
prices with little or no check on the credentials or intentions of purchasers.
James Woolsey, Director of Central Intelligence, in testimony to the US Senate
Select Intelligence Committee on 10 January 1995, claimed that:
... the proliferation of
advanced conventional weapons and technology [is] a growing military threat as
unprecedented numbers of sophisticated weapons systems are offered for sale on
the world market. Especially troubling is the proliferation of technologies and
expertise in areas such as sensors, materials, and propulsion in supporting the
development and modernisation of weapons systems. Apart from the capability of
some advanced conventional weapons to deliver weapons of mass destruction, such
weapons have the potential to significantly alter military balances, and disrupt
U.S. military operations and cause significant U.S. casualties.
(Arms Sales Monitor
1995, p. 3)
Parliamentary democracy, one-party states, military
coups
Destructive as the weapons build-up and regional and ethnic
challenges were within Third World countries, there were other equally
disruptive forces involved in challenging the viability of new nation-states.
Where postcolonial governments were established through the electoral processes
of democracy, those who entered parliament were supposed to conform to Western
European parliamentary and governmental practices. Parliamentary democracy,
particularly of the Westminster form, depends on those elected seeing themselves
as representatives, not of people in particular residential regions within the
nation, but of particular 'parties' which represent the interests of particular
social 'classes' and pressure groups, each with its distinctive ideology.
Ethnic
and clan differences are assumed to have been overridden by economically-based
class distinctions which cut across group boundaries. People are presumed to be
committed to particular ideological positions espoused by the parties for which
they vote. Parliamentary democracy of Western European varieties philosophically
presupposes a commitment by the majority of the population to the nation, with
individuals vicariously sharing in the achievements of the nation as though they
were their own achievements. Thomas Hobbes, in the seventeenth century, provided
the philosophical underpinnings for this form of nationalism. The commitment of
individuals to the nation creates:
... a real unity of them all
in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in
such manner as if every man should say to every man: I authorise and give up my
right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this
condition; that thou give up thy right to him and authorise all his actions in
like manner. This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a
COMMONWEALTH.
(Hobbes 1909 [1651], ch. 17)
The
government becomes the individual writ large, and individuals effectively enter
into contract with the government to support it as long as all other individuals
in the nation do so, too. However, this form of commitment presupposes an
existing unity or nationalism amongst the populace. Government is aimed at
balancing the competing interests of classes and pressure groups, fulfilling
their aspirations at the national level.
Neither
the 'classes'22 nor widely endorsed 'parties'23 and
ideologies existed in most newly independent countries. As General Murtala
Mohammed said of Nigeria in 1976:
There has been a lively
debate in the press urging the introduction of one form of political ideology or
another. Past events have, however, shown that we cannot build a future for this
country on a rigid political ideology. Such an approach would be unrealistic.
The evolution of a doctrinal concept is usually predicated upon the general
acceptance by the people of a national political philosophy and, consequently,
until all our people, or a large majority of them, have acknowledged a common
ideological motivation, it would be fruitless to proclaim any particular
philosophy or ideology in our constitution.
(Murtala
Mohammed 1976, pp. 12-15)
As
Murtala Mohammed argued, variant political ideologies within a nation detail
alternative biases in organisation and activity, based on a common underlying understanding of the world and commitment to national
government. Where that common understanding and commitment do not exist, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to gain widespread, long-term support for the
particular ideology of a political party. Rather, people define themselves in
terms of ethnic and regional identity.24
In Third
World nations, therefore, while those elected to office might have publicly
endorsed particular political ideologies25 which
spelt out alternative forms of centralised government of the nation, they knew,
or soon found out, that their constituents were not committed to the articulated
ideology and many of them simply did not understand its rationale. Rather,
people presumed members of parliament to be committed to the communities which
they represented. The communities saw central government, not as an important
institution through which the national economy might be safeguarded and nurtured
or through which the nation might achieve 'stability' or 'economic well-being'
or 'greatness', but as the source of jobs, wealth and goods which could flow to
themselves if their representative was astute. As Okwudiba Nnoli said of
Nigeria:
Nigerianisation involved
efforts by the ethnically based ruling parties in the regions to secure the
complete domination of the regional public service positions by the relevant
regional functionaries, or, in their absence, to prevent rival ethnic groups
from filling the relevant posts. This same strategy was evident in the inter
ethnic struggle for positions in the federal public service.
(Nnoli 1980, p. 196)
Paula
Brown spelt out a similar scene in her study of leadership in the New Guinea
Highlands:
... achievement of a high
elective position has the greatest prestige and rewards ... The competition and
ambitions of Simbu are demonstrated in the large number of nominees, the lavish
expenditure of candidates on their campaigns, the significance of success and
expectations of rewards by their followers. Support of a candidate is an
important rural social activity. Provincial and national political office are
the counters in Simbu intergroup and interpersonal competition of the 1980s.
(Brown 1987, p. 102)
This
direct relationship between the politician and his or her constituency is, of
course, closer to the Athenian ideal of democracy than is the party system of
Western democracy, but in the absence of a sense of unity amongst all those
whose representatives formed government, it resulted in political and
governmental chaos. When parliamentarians are intent
on ensuring that as much of the national wealth as possible is siphoned off to
themselves and to their regions, government becomes a process of dividing up the
spoils of office, not of focused 'national development'. As Brown said:
With the continued
concentration of financial resources in government, politics is the way to
wealth ... Power and prestige in the province focus upon the town; a multi
ethnic elite runs the affairs of the province and has connections with the
national government, business, and sports activities. The rural communities are
its dependents and the source of votes, customers, clients, and parishioners ...
these leaders are not detached from their rural relatives for two reasons.
First, the selected officials represent rural constituencies where they must be
nominated, campaign, receive votes, and serve rural supporters. In their
distribution of benefits they reward their supporters and constituents with jobs
and services. Second, the upper and urban segment is not independent of a rural
base. Although they may live and work outside the rural area they contribute to
rural affairs of their kinsmen, clan, and constituents and participate in some
rural activities.
(Brown 1987, p. 103)
Nnoli
described the situation as it developed in Nigeria:
Most Nigerians have come to
believe that unless their 'own men' are in government they are unable to secure
those socio-economic amenities that are disbursed by the government. Hence,
governmental decisions about the siting of industries, the building of roads,
award of scholarships, and appointments to positions in the public services, are
closely examined in terms of their benefits to the various ethnic groups in the
country. In fact, there has emerged a crop of 'ethnic watchers' who devote much
of their time and energy to assessing the differential benefits of the various
groups from any government project.
(Nnoli 1978, p. 176)
During
the 1980s, while living on the island of Tabiteuea in the Republic of Kiribati
in the central Pacific during national elections, I canvassed the views of
people as to the right kind of parliamentarian for their community. Every person
with whom I spoke said that it was the responsibility of the elected person to
gain as much for their community as possible from the central government. People
also focused on the cash income and other benefits flowing to the holder of the
office. It was felt that the position of member of parliament was something of a
sinecure, and the salary and 'perks' which went with
the job belonged not only to the member but also to the community to which he or
she belonged. It was, therefore, reasonable to 'share the job around', so that a
number of communities might benefit from this cash flow.
The
candidates all similarly claimed that they would only be elected if they could
show that they could obtain more for the community than others before them and
that their own income would be more widely distributed. Re-election depended on
this perception of the performance of the member of parliament. The man who was
finally re-elected for a second term had developed a strategy through which his
income was shared beyond his own community. In fact, he insisted, and it seemed
correct, that he spent more of his money in helping marginal groups than in
helping those who strongly supported him and considered him a member of their
community.
Both the
candidates and people in the electorate were able to name those in the previous
parliament who had been most successful, and in all cases their success was
judged by what they had managed to obtain for their electorates. When I asked
people how they knew who were most successful, they answered that they knew
through listening to the parliamentary broadcasts. People in the community who
had radios often listened to parliament, not to find out about the country's
external relations, or to judge the effectiveness with which the nation was
being governed, but in order to hear who were most forceful and effective in
representing their electorates and which electorates were being favoured in any
'development' exercises or in infrastructure maintenance and upgrading. If the
community felt that their representative was inadequate, that person was most
unlikely to be re-elected, and so each new parliament comprises large numbers of
new members, with little or no experience of parliamentary procedures, and far
more commitment to their own electorates than to centralised government. As was
found (Geddes 1997) in examining Papua New Guinean parliamentary
experience, during the 1980s and 1990s some sixty per cent of those elected in
national elections were first timers, elected because they were perceived to be
capable of better representing the interests of their communities and regions.
Not only
are members of national and regional parties considered to be conduits of wealth
and goods to their electorates, local-level politics is similarly competitive.
Peter Weil (1971) explained this well for local council activity in the Gambia:
Within any given electoral
ward, various villages have particular demands. Inevitably some villages do not
get the well or other project they have been demanding during their councillor's
tenure, and the interests of these villages will then probably be in opposition
to those of other villages. If a group of villages tends to unite around an
issue, that group tends to be opposed by another group of villages with
another issue. Thus, a type of opposition over
specific issues operates at the local level in Area Council elections.
(Weil 1971, p. 110)
This
orientation, of course, makes it extremely difficult to govern nationally,
regionally or locally. Parliamentarians and councillors are far more interested
in gaining resources for themselves and their constituents than they are in
regional government and development planning. And, since it is more important to
obtain resources than to observe the niceties of Western concepts of 'honesty'
and 'integrity', based as they are on presumption of the separation of politics
and administration, of political activity and government spending, Third World
governments, at whatever level, seem, almost inevitably, to be riddled with
'corruption'.26 Politics becomes reduced to patron-clientism,
with those in power concentrating wealth and influence in their own hands,
maintaining their support bases through providing privileged access to the jobs,
wealth and influence they control. As Awazurike said:
The evidence in the last
decade continues to point to a dismal outlook for third-world democracies ...
The twin forces of economic woes and the opportunism of powerful oligarches
ensure that from India and Pakistan to Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, the fate of
fledgling attempts at democratisation continues to raise more questions than
answers - not least of which is the seeming ambivalence of the advanced
industrial nations to the spread and deepening of genuine democratic movements
since the late 1950s.
(Awazurike 1990, p. 56)
One-party states
In many
postcolonial nations, leaders, in the face of such pressures, did away with
democratic multi-party politics, declaring 'one-party' states with strong
leaders who appointed the representatives from each region of the country, or
who ensured that the candidates in any election all accepted their leadership.
The ways in which this shift to single-party rule were effected varied from
country to country. The movement to one-party rule was, of course, often not
entirely internally determined. In the international climate of ideological
battle, the intelligence services of major Cold War countries attempted to
ensure that Third World governments remained ideologically committed to their
bias. In Indonesia, the overthrow of President Sukarno and the installation of
Suharto as President of the country in 1967 seems to have been a consequence of
just such activity. As a Baobab Press article described of Indonesia's move to
this form of government:
By the early 1960s, tensions
between Washington and Jakarta were at an all time high, in large part because
of Sukarno's 'growing resistance to foreign aid from Western countries,'
explains a States News Service report that appeared in the Washington Post on
May 21, 1990. It was then that U.s. diplomats and intelligence officials decided
to consummate the results of years of painstaking espionage. Over a period of
several months beginning in October of 1965, high-ranking officials of the State
Department turned over the names of more than 5,000 key members of the
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) to Sukarno's opponent, Gen. T. N. J. Suharto,
says the States News Service report. The story adds that the Indonesian
communist group was at the time the largest in the world after the U.5.5.R. and
China, and that American diplomats, after supplying the list of names, 'later
checked off the names of those who had been killed or captured.' The report
describes the list of names turned over to the Indonesian general as 'a detailed
who's who of the leadership of PKI,' that identified committee members and
organisers of labour and youth groups at the national, provincial and municipal
levels ... It is unknown how many people were killed in the bloodbath that
followed ... The CIA estimated in 1968 that at least 250,000 people were rounded
up and slaughtered, and called the incident 'one of the worst mass murders of
the 20th century.' A 1966 Washington Post report estimated deaths at closer to
half a million. But all accounts agreed that the Indonesian communist movement
had been wiped out. The disclosure of the names and the subsequent massacre were
not isolated events. They took place against a backdrop of psychological warfare
which helped set the stage for Sukarno's eventual removal from office. A 1975
Congressional investigation into CIA covert activities uncovered evidence, for
example, of a clandestine U.S.-sponsored propaganda campaign designed to
discredit Sukarno by circulating accusations of sexual improprieties to news
media throughout the world. By the time of the bloody anticommunist purge,
Sukarno was on his way out. Gen. Suharto was installed in March of 1967 as
interim president.
(Baobab Press 1993)
The
following was the official Suharto Indonesian Government explanation of the
precursors to, and rationale for, its political reorganisation of the country
from 1967, following the period of political turmoil described above (see Cribb
1990 for a detailed examination of the period):
The Government Manifesto of
November 3, 1945, opened the way to a rapid growth of political parties. Soon a
multi-party system emerged with parties of different ideologies, ranging from
nationalism to socialism, religion and even
Marxism/Leninism. Hence, the political structure developed into a liberal
democracy that was a complete departure from the type of democracy envisaged by
Pancasila.
With sharply conflicting
ideologies, political rivalry was the order of the day and a stable Government
was out of the question. With a total of 23 political parties and their
factions, cabinets could only be formed on the basis of a shaky compromise
between the strongest parties. In point of fact, coalition cabinets were formed
and dissolved very often. The administration was a complete shambles and
development was a far cry.
The first and only general
election ever held during the rule of the Old Order took place in 1955. Even
that election did not produce a strong cabinet with a solid back-up in
Parliament. On the contrary, because political conditions continued to
deteriorate, the President ordered the formation of a Constituent Assembly to
draft a new constitution. However, as mentioned earlier, this only ended up in a
total deadlock which led the President to take all the power of the state into
his own hands under the pretext of guided democracy.
Having learned from the
experience of the unlimited multiparty system of the past, the New Order
Government, which came into office in 1967, decided to Simplify the political
system along the following lines:
1. In order to minimise
ideological conflicts between political organisations, all political
organisations shall adopt Pancasila as their sole basis principle.
2. To simplify the political
system, particularly for the purpose of choosing a political organisation by the
people in general elections it was felt that the number of these organisations
should be reduced.
3. In the past, villages were
made the bases of political activities and manoeuvres, most notably in the
heyday of the Indonesian Communist Party. This adversely affected the social and
economic life of the village populations. Hence, it would be desirable to free
villages from the activities of political organisations.
Furthermore, the large number
of organisations has been reduced by the fusion of parties and their affiliated
organisations into two political parties-Partai
Persatuan Pembangunan (The United Development Party or Partai Persatuan) and
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (the Indonesian Democracy Party or PDI), and one
Functional Group or Golongan Karya (Golkar).
Partai Persatuan is a fusion
of Nahdlatul Ulama (the Moslem Scholars Party), Parmusi (the Moslem Party), PSII
(the Islamic Confederation) and PERIl (the Islamic Union).
PDI is a fusion of the former
PNI (the Nationalist Party), the Catholic Party, the Christian (Protestant)
Party, the Indonesian Independence Party, and Partai Murba (the People's Party).
Golkar accommodates the
aspirations and political rights and duties of functional groups that are not
affiliated with either party, namely civil servants, retired members of the
Armed Forces, women's organisations, professional groups, farmers, students,
etc.
By virtue of the 1983
Guidelines of State Policy and on the basis of Act No.3 of 1985, Pancasila has
finally been adopted as the one and only ideological principle upon which all
political organisations base their activities.
(Soetjipto et al. 1995)
This
reorganisation of political activity placed the ruling party (Golkar) in the
powerful position of claiming the allegiance of the armed forces and members of
the civil service, scrutinising and approving the constitutions and platforms of
the other parties and of controlling their electoral activities in rural areas.
The President was given the right to dissolve any political party whose policies
were not 'in the interests of the state' or whose membership comprised less than
one quarter of the population. Indonesia became, and effectively remains a
'one-party' state, despite its apparent multi-party organisation.27
Indonesia was not alone in reorganising its political landscape. In
Africa, by 1969, ninety per cent of the postcolonial nations were governed
through single-party systems or by military regimes, many of which justified
their seizure of power by claiming that the elected governments had become
irredeemably corrupt (Young 1970, p.460). In former Asian colonies effective
one-party states quickly emerged in most countries, and military coups occurred
in many of the new nations. Sangmpam claimed that:
Third World countries are
characterised by a specific form of political competition marked by violent
eruption of conflicts. From 1958 to 1965, about 70 percent of Third World
countries experienced violent conflicts ranging from
secession to open warfare, and 68 military coups were successful. From 1965 to
1985, about 130 coups occurred in Third World countries; of about 10 million
violent, conflict-related deaths in the world, 99.94 percent were in Third World
countries ...
(Sangmpam 1994, p. 4)
Where
one-party government was imposed, or governments were deposed by military
leaders, this frequently seemed to provide strong central government, though
such governments have been widely condemned for their 'human rights' records.
Fred Riggs claimed that:
... data from a 1985 survey
of Third World regimes reveal correlations between breakdowns and regime type.
The high survival level of single-party regimes reflects the ability of ruling
parties to control the elected assembly (and hence to govern arbitrarily), and
to dominate the bureaucracy (and hence to prevent a coup). By contrast, since
all presidentialist regimes in the Third World have experienced catastrophic
breakdowns, it is concluded that the ability of divided government to control
its bureaucracy and to provide coherent policy direction is so flawed that coups
are virtually unavoidable.
(Riggs 1993, p. 199)
Military coups
Throughout the Third World multi-party democracies have, as Riggs
suggested, 'experienced catastrophic breakdowns', usually followed by military
coups. Arthur Nwankwo spelt out his view of the situation in Nigeria in 1966
when a multi-party, democratically elected parliament was overthrown by a
military coup:
On 15 January 1966 Nigeria's
post-colonial experiment with democracy ended when soldiers struck, killing some
politicians, sacking the civilian government, and imposing military rule.
Several factors were responsible for the collapse of Nigeria's First Republic,
but among the most crucial was Regionalism, with its attendant ethnic dominance
of each of the three regional governments. The regions constituted the political
base for the contenders of power at the Federal level, and tribal or ethnic
sentiments were used by these politicians to whip up support for their equally
regionally and ethnically-based parties ... In the struggle, the powerful
regional governments overwhelmed and incapacitated the Federal Government,
regardless of the central government's constitutional superiority. Thus, it was
not the Constitution that failed, but the politicians who operated it, for they
were too narrow-minded, too reckless and intellectually and emotionally
unprepared for the functions the Constitution placed on them. It was the violent
rivalry for power among the politicians, coupled with
massive corruption, brazen injustice and political and religious intolerance
which brought about the demise of the First Republic.
(Nwankwo 1984, pp. 6-7)
Where
military coups were avoided, multi-party democracy has usually been displaced by
single-party systems. Since countries which opted for one-party rule or which
were ruled by military juntas were often already experiencing inter-group
tension and confrontation, in many cases the imposition of military or one-party
rule masked continuing conflict within the nation. In Nigeria, as in many other
countries ruled militarily, military rule has been punctuated by coups and
counter-coups.
In both
militarily ruled and one-party states, those holding power have intruded ever
more directly and forcefully into those areas of activity which Western people
are strongly convinced should be outside the realm of politics. Sangmpam has
argued that the state, in many Third World countries, has become 'over
politicised'. As he said:
By over politicisation I mean
(1) the use of overt compulsion by those holding power to organise political
representation, participation, and competition for ... goods and services ... ;
(2) the fluidity of state power and constant insecurity characterising holders
of state power in their relations with other social actors; (3) political
participation and competition outside established institutions; (4) the lack of
compromise over the outcome of political competition; and (5) the general use of
open violence and confrontation in such participation and competition.
(Sangmpam 1994, p. 5)
Rather
than government providing a stable backdrop to the self-interested activities of
people competing within the marketplace (which neo-liberal commentators in the
West consider to be the function of government), political power holders have
become direct players in the economic sphere, using their positions and power to
advantage themselves and their supporters. This has effectively reorientated
many Third World communities toward patron-client forms of political, economic
and social organisation. The activities of political, business, traditional,
military and other leaders become interfused as networks of mutual support and
promotion develop. In such patron-client orientated systems, political and
economic spheres are intermeshed. To succeed economically, one needs a political
patron.
Richard
Robison (1990) provided an interesting description of a variety of forms of this
kind of political / economic activity in Indonesia. The most important of these
in Third World countries is undoubtedly what he called 'bureaucratic capitalism'. As he explained, 'bureaucratic
capitalism is a product of patrimonial bureaucratic authority in which the
demarcation between public service and private interest is at best blurred'
(1990, p. 14). Many of those involved in this kind of political activity develop
'joint ventures' with overseas companies and transnational corporations. The
politician, or person who has strong links with political authority, obtains
licences, concessions, finance, and favourable terms of business for the
overseas partner and, in return, holds stock in the company formed within the
country or is rewarded in other ways. As Robison said, 'The central feature of
the joint venture is the exchange of politically controlled economic concessions
for financial reward' (1990, p. 17).
While
Robison's study focused on such activity in Indonesia, very similar arrangements
can be found in almost every Third World country. For businesses involved in
this kind of activity it is very important that the political leaders be secure
and hold power over a long period. Every political upheaval becomes a business
upheaval as new political patrons have to be secured. For this reason, many
multinational and transnational businesses have been accused of supporting
dictatorial, repressive regimes, securing their own interests by ensuring the
long-term survival of their patrons.28
Where this cannot be arranged,
businesses have to hedge their bets, securing the commitment not only of key
political figures of the present, but also likely future players. The game
becomes much more complex and certainly more costly. It is, therefore, less
likely that foreign businesses will be attracted to countries where the
political leadership is likely to be displaced in a short period, whether by
electoral or any other means. Economic 'development', therefore, seems to favour
stable regimes, as the East and South-East Asian countries have demonstrated.
In the
climate of the 1990s, with an emphasis on privatisation introduced through the
variety of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) imposed by the World Bank and
the IMF, it became increasingly acceptable for transnational companies to hire
'security firms' to ensure the safety of their operations in areas of political
instability and lawlessness. This was justified by corporations as being
very similar to their use of such private security agencies in Western
countries. If the scale of security operations was greater, this was simply
because security problems in many Third World countries are more acute.
A
development which emerged during the 1990s has been the use of these 'security'
organisations to provide protection not only for transnational corporate
activities but also for the governments with which they do business. Two
major organisations operating in African countries during the 1980s and
1990s were the South African-based company 'Executive Outcomes' which
provided protection to mining interests in Sierra Leone and Angola, while also
providing 'consultancy services' to the governments of both countries; and the
US-based 'MPRI' company which took over the activities of 'Executive Outcomes'
in Angola. Of course, in the first decade of the 21st Century, the use of
private security firms has become far more wide-spread, fuelled by the
employment of these organisations by the U. S. military and by major
corporations and organisations operating in danger zones in non-Western
countries.
The
effect of these developments has been to reintroduce mercenary soldiers
into non-Western countries in the guise of security personnel. Whereas the
mercenaries which plagued African communities during the 1970s were funded as
expatriate soldiers who were supporting regimes fighting 'communist insurgency',
the new mercenaries, in the spirit of the times, are seen to be fighting
'international terror', the enemies of democracy and capitalism
and ensuring the stability of regimes (or the successful insurgency
of an opposing group if a regime proves unreliable) and the
profitability of transnational corporations. As such, they no longer come in the
crude guise of soldiers of fortune, now they come as 'security consultants',
providing security services and helping to 'privatise' yet another arm of
government activity, forming an even closer alliance between transnational
corporations and their political patrons.
Political support is not only available to foreign companies
(though these are usually the most lucrative source of income). Similar
arrangements are made with business people within the country, as Sklar and
Whitaker described of Nigeria:
In every region, the party
waxed fat in its house of patronage. It had money, favours, jobs, and honours to
distribute among those who would support it. To a large extent, these regional
patronage systems were based on regional marketing boards ... Invariably, the
vast majority of those who receive or hope to receive loans from the boards or
the banks are attracted by powerful inducements to join or support the regional
government party; insofar as they prosper, they may be expected to support the
party financially. The same may be said of commercial contractors who work for
the regional governments and their statutory corporations .... Who are the
masters of the regional governments? High-ranking politicians, senior
administrators, major chiefs, lords of the economy, distinguished members of the
learned professions ...
(Sklar & Whitaker 1991,
p. 79)
As key
economic, political, professional, military and traditional leaders support one
another, avenues to wealth are increasingly controlled by them, to be made
available, at their discretion, to those who support them. The result is what is
commonly seen in Third World countries: a marked division between the 'haves'
and 'have nots', with those who do not have access to the wealth of the region
increasingly dependent on those who have, tied to them in bonds of clientage. In
the climate of ethnic and clan rivalry which exists in many Third World
countries, patrons and clients see their interests as separate from those of
opposing groups who are also competing for the spoils
of political and economic power. The consequences, as both Sangmpam (1994) and
Weil (1971) have suggested, are increasing tension and eruptions of violence
which cannot be easily countered.
In the
worldwide political climate of the 1950s-1980s, this usually meant that one or
other of the internationally dominant ideological blocs readily financed and
armed opposing groups, leading to continued unrest and rebellion. Opposing
leaders, each intent on establishing their patronage and power, soon learned to
speak the language of international ideological tension, and so ensured funding
of military requirements in either resisting or instigating rebellion and armed
insurrection. Over the last decade, the language empoyed to gain support
has changed, but the consequences have not. Now, support is given to bolster
regimes or favoured insurgents in combatting 'international terror' rather
than 'Communism', but the results are very similar 29. Third World politicans and their
economic counter-parts have learned a new language and are becoming increasingly
fluent in its use.
Civil/military rule
In many
countries, long-term 'civil-military' regimes have emerged, in which the
leadership, while 'civil' (that is, not holding military rank or position), is
closely allied with the military leadership. As Hassan Gardezi described, there
has emerged, in Pakistan, a 'strong bureaucratic-military oligarchy at the helm
of the state which uses its regulatory powers to mediate the mutually competing
and at times conflicting interests' (1985, p. 1) of the country.
Arthur
Nwankwo, writing of Nigeria, suggested that this form of rule should be called
'cimilicy' and should be based on:
... civilianising the
military and militarising the civilians in a new arrangement for a new
dispensation. Government being the authoritative allocator of national resources
in response to articulated and organised group interests, it is necessary that
people who participate in government articulate and organise their views and
work together, each being fully conscious of the strength, weaknesses and rights
of others in a new social compact where the artificial lines of demarcation
between the military and the civilians is eradicated. For in theory and in deed,
all civilians and all military persons of Nigerian extraction are Nigerians and
are entitled to equal rights, privileges and dispensations and equally endowed
for the onerous task of building a New Nigeria.
(Nwanko 1984, p. xii)
To date,
Nigeria has not managed to establish a stable coalition of such interests. Other
postcolonial states, however, have been much more successful in pursuing such
policies. In nations as diverse as Egypt and Indonesia, this kind of
civilian-military alliance has been effectively pursued over some thirty to
forty years. The degree to which such alliances have disenfranchised
communities and populations has been a matter of vigorous debate over the
past fifteen years. It has commonly been claimed that such 'dictatorships'
ride roughshod over individual human rights, as expressed in various United
Nations declarations. Some of the more stable of these
regimes have replied, as Indonesian authorities have, that:
It is now generally accepted
that all categories of human rights-civil, political, economic, social and
cultural, the rights of the individual and the rights of the community, the
society and the nation-are interrelated and indivisible. The promotion and
protection of all these rights should therefore be undertaken in an integrated
and balanced manner. Inordinate emphasis on one category of human rights over
another should be eschewed. Likewise, in assessing the human rights conditions
of countries, particularly developing countries, the international community
should take into account the situation in relation to all categories of human
rights-following the principles contained in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. Article 29 of that Declaration addresses two aspects that balance each
other: On the one hand, there are principles that respect the fundamental rights
and freedoms of the individual; on the other, there are stipulations regarding
the obligations of the individual toward the society and the state.
(Alatas 1995)
United
Nations emphasis on the rights of individuals, at the expense of community and
nation are considered unbalanced and in need of correction. However, such
statements have been vigorously rejected by prodemocracy groups throughout the
world. As Jeremy Hobbs of Community Aid Abroad (CAA) has said:
Australia's special
relationship with Indonesia is viewed with bitter cynicism by Indonesian
non-government organisations. For them it is supremely ironic that Australia,
arguably the most democratic country in the region, is not prepared to take a
tougher line on free speech, human rights, democracy and labour issues. Worse,
we have been happy to fill the breach when the [US] Clinton administration
withdrew military support because of its concerns over human rights.
(Hobbs 1995, p. 1)
Since
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Western powers have increasingly insisted
on a return by Third World governments to multiparty political systems based on
Western democratic ideals. As Andrew Purvis claimed:
As recently as five years
ago, sub-Saharan Africa seemed poised on the verge of a new democratic era. The
end of the cold war and mounting pressure from Western donors for political
reform as a condition for ongoing aid led to a flurry of multiparty elections,
and millions of voters eager for a change trekked to
the polls ... [However] Africa's veteran rulers know what they are up to. Many
of them have been denied foreign aid because of their autocratic regimes. But
once elections have been held, or in some cases merely promised, Western aid
dollars begin flowing again ... This is not the first time Africa has wrestled
with multiparty governance. Immediately after many countries gained independence
in the 1960s, political parties flourished, elections were called, and voters
rejoiced. But then many of independent Africa's founding fathers convinced their
people that the single-party state was the only way. The result was the lost
years of the '70s and the economic disarray of the '80s. The only hope is that
Western donors, together with Africa's more reform-minded leaders, will not
stand for such backsliding again.
(Purvis 1996)
Like
Purvis, many Western commentators believe that most of the Third World's woes
can be traced to the forms of government which have emerged over the past forty
years. Autocratic governments, dominated by corrupt, self-serving politicians,
have mismanaged economies and increased their own wealth and power at the
expense of their electorates. In order to overcome these problems, it is
considered necessary to return to Western governmental practices, to
multi-party, democratic government. However, it can be argued, as Nef (1991, pp.
16ff.) has for Latin America, that, in part, the emergence and dominance of
repressive regimes has been a requirement and a consequence of the kinds of
'economic development' pursued in those countries since the late 1960s. As Nef
argued:
The 1970's was a period of
drastic de-democratisation and demobilisation. It was also an era when the old
'structuralist' policies of import substitution industrialisation (with its
corollary, the welfare state) were replaced by the new monetarist policy of
deindustrialisation, denationalisation, shrinkage of government services, the
early phase of structural adjustments and a profound vertical expansion of the
police function of the state (and repression) throughout the hemisphere. The
events are too oft repeated to require discussion here. What is important,
however, is to highlight the decline of developmentalism as a desired strategy
and discourse for conflict-management by both Latin American and U. S. elites.
In fact, new 'reactionary coalitions' were forged, leading to a new type of
dependency resulting from a growing process of transnationalisation of the Latin
American state ... As time went by and the illusion of economic miracles became
ever more distant, development along orthodox Keynesian, liberal lines moved
ever further and further to the background. To make prices and wages
'competitive', in the context of neoliberal, free
market strategies, labour was repressed and purposely atomised, working class
organisations were persecuted, left wing parties disbanded ... as the
foreign-induced economic miracles failed to materialise, all that was left was a
repressive state keeping a very large marginal sector at bay.
(Nef 1991, pp. 17-18)
The
developmentalist models of Third World development experts, which placed
emphasis on the role of government in stimulating and guiding economic
development, came into disrepute during the 1970s, at about the same time as the
Keynesian economic models of the West came under siege from neo-liberal
alternatives. In their place the neo-liberal monetarist policies of Margaret
Thatcher in Britain and of conservative politics throughout most of the Western
world during the late 1970s and the 1980s and 1990s, became the stuff of
development specialist advice in the Third World through the 1970s and since
that time.30
This
shift coincided with a rapid increase in Third World indebtedness following a
sharp increase in oil prices in the early 1970s. From the late 1970s, lenders
became increasingly concerned at the mounting debt of Third World countries. As
Dan Connell has said, 'From 1970 to 1989, according to UN reports, Third World
debt skyrocketed from $68.4 billion to $1,262.8 billion, leaving several nations
owing more than they produce in annual income' (1993, p. 1). This came to a head
in the early 1980s, when international creditors decided it was time to act to
protect their investments. For most, the central consideration in ensuring the
economic viability of Third World nations was the 'downsizing' of government and
the deregulation of all economic, financial and fiscal activity. Effectively,
this meant a complete reorganisation of government, a determined swing away from
'left-wing' politics to the politics of the marketplace. As Friedson has spelt
out for Latin America:
... for neo liberals
developmentalism had hampered development, and only a free-market economy
guaranteed the road to prosperity. For them, the main problem of Latin America
was not dependency but the burden of an inefficient and corrupt state that
prevented growth and modernisation ... with the worsening of the economic
situation in the early 1980s, newly established civilian governments found
themselves with few resources to confront a powerful community of international
creditors determined to collect their, debts. Thus, military governments as well
as their civilian successors endorsed versions of the IMF adjustment program,
which stressed domestic mismanagement as the cause of payment problems and
domestic adjustment (reduction of government expenditures, curtailment of public
subsidies, devaluations and trade liberalization) as a
way out of the crisis ... many of the IMF measures curtailed state power, which
carried obvious political costs. In the first half of the 1980s, many Latin
American governments found themselves signing agreements that were, for the most
part, not to their liking ... instead of prosperity, Latin America witnessed
further economic decline and impoverishment as a result of the
externally-enforced adjustment programs implemented in the early 1980s ... This
no doubt represented a major blow for the technocratic approach to the debt
crisis promoted by the IMF, which assumed that all it took to overcome the
economic crisis was the decisive action of governments to liberalise their
economies.
(Friedson 1983, pp. 33-5)
Cheru
has spelt out some of the demands of such programs:
a) liberalization of import
controls;
b) devaluation of the
country's exchange rate;
c) a domestic
anti-inflationary program which will control bank credits and [exercise] control
over government deficit by curbing spending, increased taxation, abolition of
consumer subsidies;
d) a program of greater
hospitality to multinational companies (MNCs) .
... As President Kaunda of
Zambia put it, 'The IMF does not care whether you are suffering economic
malaria, bilharzia or broken legs. They will always give you quinine'. The
policy prescriptions listed above reflect the Fund's political and economic
ideology rather than the interests of the developing countries.
(Cheru 1989, p. 37)
In order
to ensure that the necessary 'structural adjustments' were made to Third World
economies so that they might benefit from the increased competitive advantages
that it was assumed would accrue from an unfettered 'enterprise economy:
governments needed to be firmly in control, able to apply the 'pain' which
would, necessarily, precede the economic' gain' of this radical shift from
welfare economics to free market economics. As Mark Moberg described for Chile,
one of the first Latin American countries to experience these changes:
After overthrowing the
elected Allende government in 1973, the Chilean military crushed leftist
parties, unions, and peasant associations. Then, in an unwelcome surprise to
some elites that had initially invited the coup, the military disbanded right
wing and centrist parties as well ... Such measures
were necessary, the military claimed, to enable it to impose harsh deflationary
policies 'in the national interest' without organised opposition.
(Moberg 1994, p. 216)
The need
for this degree of control resulted, in many countries, in an increased emphasis
on 'law and order', and increased expenditures to bolster both police and
paramilitary strength to support government in its determination to set in place
the necessary changes to ensure long-term economic growth. As Ihonvbere claimed:
The political tensions that
have accompanied monetarism have furthered repression, human rights abuses,
riots and national disintegration ... The very high degree of human suffering,
disillusionment, anger, alienation, rural decay, urban dislocation, suicides,
marital crises, prostitution and crime which have accompanied monetarist
responses to the African economic crisis, hold major implications for the
potency of ethnicity and the subversion of the goals of nationhood.
(Ihonvbere 1994, p. 51)
The appearance of democracy
As
tensions have mounted in many countries, governments have felt compelled to
increase their coercive authority. Most Third World governments, in the
past thirty years, have found themselves on the horns of a dilemma. They
are being pressured by First World governments and organisations into both
deregulation of economic activity, which requires increased coercive authority,
and the ratification and implementation of human rights programs and principles.
As Purvis suggested, this has led to a rhetoric in favour of multi-party
democracy 31 and implementation of human rights
programs, accompanied by further politicisation of the directive agencies of
government.
This
increasing politicisation of both the police forces and court systems has
delegitimised both sets of institutions in the eyes of many people in Third
World countries, leading to increasing fear and tension within Third World
nations and to further political repression. The politicisation of police forces
and courts has been accompanied by the politicisation of law, establishing
statutes which can be used to legitimise government repression and make it
increasingly difficult for individuals and groups to defend themselves against
politically motivated criminal charges. As Amnesty International spelt out for
the African continent:
There is a developing pattern
of human rights violations in parts of Africa in which governments publicly
committed to political pluralism adopt methods of curbing domestic opposition
and criticism which are designed to minimise the
likelihood of international disapproval and to keep their democratic credentials
intact. Certain types of legal charge are proving increasingly attractive to
governments seeking to criminalise peaceful political activity or dissent in
this new context. These charges include sedition, contempt of court, subversion,
defamation, possession of classified documents, and holding meetings or
demonstrations without an official permit.
(Amnesty International 1995)
The
reality in many Third World nations since the mid 1990s is that while
governments are being pressured to reinstitute multi-party democratic political
processes, contradictory pressures coming from the First World, in fact, produce
multi-party democratic rhetoric, coupled with the entrenchment of coercive,
autocratic government. This has resulted in continuing unrest and rebellion in
many Third World countries.
The
tensions we have examined in this article have not lessened in the first
decade of the 21st century. In many cases they have become stronger and more
challenging to the viability of Third World national governments. Governments
are being subjected to international pressures from First World governments
and non-government organisations; to demands of the international
marketplace; of international organisations and enterprises; to the
demands of electorates which see central, regional and local government as
resources to be mined; and to the tensions associated with competing
regional, ethnic and clan-based patron-client networks. They are also being
pressured by demands from First world countries to control incipient terrorism
within their borders and, simultaneously, to prevent refugee flows to
Western countries which, in the minds of Western populations, might include
individuals and groups seeking to pursue terrorist agendas within First World
countries. These problems,
compounded by a range of environmental and economic problems of equal magnitude,
make the future of many Third World governments highly problematic.
In
Geddes (1997) some of the internal political experiences of two of these new
nations: Nigeria, which received its independence from Britain in 1960, and
Papua New Guinea, which gained independence from Australia in 1975 are examined.
These nations provide insight into many of the political problems experienced by
Third World nations as they have attempted to forge workable national political
and administrative institutions in the face of mounting internal and external
pressures.
References
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Notes
1This
developmental project is based on a millennial belief in the existence of an
evolutionary process in which all cultures and all peoples are involved. Human
beings have a common evolutionary direction. This assumed process inverts
the biological model of evolution. Whereas the biological model assumes
increasing diversity, the social evolutionary model assumes increasing
convergence.
The
process has been explained in many ways and takes many forms, as Blaut (1992,
pp. 1-2) has described, his own explanation, of course, being one of them:
... the date
1492 represents the breakpoint between two fundamentally different evolutionary
epochs. The conquest of America begins, and explains, the rise of Europe ...
Before 1492, cultural evolution in the Eastern Hemisphere was proceeding evenly
across the landscape; in Africa, Asia, and Europe a multitude of centres were
evolving out of (broadly) feudalism and toward (broadly) capitalism.
This belief in a universal evolutionary direction is a feature of
the particular historical experiences of Western Europeans (see History of the Emergence of Capitalism). Blaut's schema is no less Eurocentric than all those
others which he condemns for this 'evil'. Capitalism, of course, is no more
advanced or retrograde than any other cultural form underpinning systems of
status and ranking in communities, it is required by the particular social
templates which govern behaviour in Western societies. And, it requires the
historical antecedents of Western Europe.
It can no more successfully be grafted onto other cultural
communities than the Potlatch could successfully be grafted onto Western
communities. Hence the catalogue of failures amassed by those most deeply
involved in this enterprise. And hence, also, the disorientation and disruption
of communities, and cultural and material poverty of so many people in the world
affected by those intent on global modernisation.
2 For
discussion see Banuri (1990); Levy (1988); Leys (1992); Peet (1990); Philip
(1990); Seligson & Passe-Smith (1993); So (1989); Sutton et al. (1989),
etcetera.
3 And still is
believed by many of those most directly involved in advising Third World
governments.
4 The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index
provides graphic illustration of the blatantly ethnocentric judgements
made, assuming that Western forms of governmental organisation and practice are
the standards against which all the world should be judged. Of course corruption
exists everywhere and where communities are unravelling and law and order are
less effective one will find practices which, in the eyes of inhabitants, are
corrupt (see Ideology and Reality, Subsistence and Status). However, what constitutes corruption
must always be judged against the forms and processes of leadership
and communal organisation found in a community and country (cf Geddes 1997, Ch.
9 for illustration). To do otherwise is to engage in social-engineering,
re-fashioning non-Western systems of government and leadership to mimic Western
forms. This produces the very conditions that 'development'
enthusiasts and Western moralists are attempting to reform (see Ideology and Reality).
5 See Sakakibara (1993) for
a discussion of some of the differences between Japanese and Western experience;
also History of the Emergence of Capitalism for a discussion of the
historical underpinnings of Western forms.
6 See Rachel
Stohl (2008) for a discussion of changed US military assistance
focuses.
The internet is
replete with examples of the ways in which funding follows 'anti-terror'
rhetoric: Philippine Marines on Front Line in War on
Terror Reconstruction Team Serves on Front Line of War
on Terror
The Front Line in the War on Terror: It's
Israel now, not Afghanistan ...
7 There seems
to have been little challenge of the expertise and focuses of these
advisors, despite the recent (2009) financial crises. Neo-liberalism places the
market at the centre of 'development'. The presumption is that if the state
privatises as much of its activity as possible, making it directly answerable to
'market forces', and deregulates fiscal and financial activity, market forces
will ensure rational, efficient economic organisation and activity which will,
in the long-run, result in a more rational organisation of society, to the
benefit of its members. A fundamental presumption underpinning neo-liberalism is
that all cultural and social forms are derivatives of individual, competitive,
acquisitive behaviour, which is fundamental to human nature, so that social
change is driven by competitive individual exchange. Uninhibited market exchange
most directly expresses that human nature. Therefore, by subjecting communities
to 'market forces', one introduces rational social change (see Reciprocity and Exchange for more on this). Of course, these
presumptions are questionable and open to challenge. However, even accepting the
premises, the presumption that uninhibited individualistic competitive activity
as expressed in the marketplace will result in social good requires a remarkable
leap of faith. There seems to be no evidence from history that this is so (History of the Emergence of Capitalism).
8 This placed
the state at the centre of development planning and implementation, usually
mapped out in five-year development plans.
9
see Mair, Stefan, 2008, 'The Need to Focus on Failing States'
in Failed States, Vol. 29 (4) - Winter
Issue for a balanced discussion of the nature of failed states and
reality of their threat to 'international security'.
10 Nation-states in Western Europe emerged during the 18th and
19th centuries. Their forms of organisation and interaction
however were not invented overnight. They were forged in more than a 1000
years of European history. ‘Nation’ was a term which originally referred to
administrative regions of the Medieval Western-Orthodox Church, based in Rome
but governing western Europe through a bureaucratic organisation controlled by
regional ecclesiastical administrators. The representatives of those regions in
Rome lived in a set of enclaves known as ‘nations’. As Thomas Dandelet (1997)
has explained, ‘it was in medieval Rome that the numerous local identities of
Europe were commonly grouped under the five major "nations" of France, England,
Spain, Italy, and Germany’. A rag-bag of regions not included in those named was
referred to as the ‘Netherlands’ (the lands beyond the recognised regions).
Peoples who lived in these regions not only thought of themselves as members of
their local communities but also knew the name of the administrative region of
the Church within which they lived. And, almost inevitably, over a thousand
years, political aspirations of rulers in western Europe (who were, on their
accession to power, annointed to their positions by regional ecclesiatical
administrators) became identified with the regions and with the names they bore.
By the 18th century everyone in western Europe knew the name of the
region within which they lived and identified themselves in some way as
belonging to the region that bore that name. So, national identity (that is,
nationalism) preceded the establishment of nation-states.
In stark contrast, the names and identities of Third World nations were,
in large measure, inventions of the past 100 years of colonial rule, through
which colonial powers identified regions they controlled. The colonised peoples
identified the names and the administrative organisations through which they
were controlled as ‘foreign’ colonial impositions. Yet, over the past sixty
years, Western nations have insisted that people living in those artificially
contrived nation-states would, with little difficulty, identify themselves with,
and commit themselves to the nations within which they lived.
A
brief selection of relevant texts includes: Gellner (1994); Goddard, Liobera
& Shore (1994); Hobsbawm (1990); Kedourie (1993); and Norbu
(1992).
11 See Herbert
Spencer (1968 [1840], pp. 49-65, 1857) for a succinct nineteenth-century
'theoretical' statement of this principle for the social sciences:
... the series
of changes gone through during the development of a seed into a tree, or an ovum
into an animal, constitute an advance from homogeneity of structure to
heterogeneity of structure. In its primary stage, every germ consists of a
substance that is uniform throughout, both in texture and chemical composition.
The first step is the appearance of a difference between two parts of this
substance; or, as the phenomenon is called in physiological language, a
differentiation. Each of these differentiated divisions presently begins itself
to exhibit some contrast of parts: and by and by these secondary
differentiations become as definite as the original one. This process is
continuously repeated—is simultaneously going on in all parts of the growing
embryo; and by endless such differentiations there is finally produced that
complex combination of tissues and organs constituting the adult animal or
plant. This is the history of all organisms whatever. It is settled beyond
dispute that organic progress consists in a change from the homogeneous to the
heterogeneous. Now, we propose in the first place to show, that this law of
organic progress is the law of all progress. Whether it be in the development of
the Earth, in the development of Life upon its surface, in the development of
Society, of Government, of Manufactures, of Commerce, of Language, Literature,
Science, Art, this same evolution of the simple into the complex, through
successive differentiations, holds throughout. From the earliest traceable
cosmical changes down to the latest results of civilization, we shall find that
the transformation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous, is that in which
progress essentially consists. (Spencer 1857, p.10)
This
belief, of course, still holds in many 'evolutionary' theoretical constructs of
the present.
12 England
experienced its revolution in the second half of the seventeenth century; France
in the late-eighteenth century; Germany in the mid-nineteenth century; and other
Western European nation-states experienced similar revolutions during the same
period.
13 Those who
identified with each other as belonging to the same nation were usually those
who had reason to travel or to associate with others who travelled. In Western
Europe there was a strong sense of unity amongst merchants, traders, landed
gentry, and educated people which resulted, in Britain as elsewhere, in a
revolution of these 'middle sorts' (Manning 1976) against feudally-based
aristocracies and governments. Through such revolution, in which, very usually,
these 'middle sorts' managed to obtain the commitment of peasant and labouring
people, they established new forms of government which reflected and enhanced
their particular interests (see History of the Emergence of Capitalism), .
14 see Crick 1997
for further discussion of colonial practices and influences.
15 Such
pressures have not lessened in the post-Cold War years. The following is a brief
excerpt from a much longer and more detailed commitment by all the nations of
the world to 'human rights' and 'social development' on the occasion of the 50th
anniversary of the United Nations (UN 1995):
We heads of
State and Government are committed to a political, economic, ethical and
spiritual vision for social development that is based on human dignity, human
rights, equality, respect, peace, democracy, mutual responsibility and
cooperation, and full respect for the various religious and ethical values and
cultural backgrounds of people. Accordingly, we will give the highest priority
in national, regional and international policies and actions to the promotion of
social progress, justice and the betterment of the human condition, based on
full participation by all.
The
resolutions of the World Summit for Social Development list, in detail, the
concerns of First World governments during the 1990s, transferred onto the rest
of the world as the concerns of all nations.
16 Including:
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF); Food and Agriculture Organisation
(FAO); United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); World Health
Organisation (WHO); United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organisation (UNESCO); International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO); United
Nations Development Program (UNDP); United Nations Environment Program (UNEP);
United Nations Centre for Human Rights (UNCHR); World Food Program (WFP);
International Labour Organisation (ILO); International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA); International Maritime Organisation (IMO); International
Telecommunications Union (ITU); International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (The World Bank); International Monetary Fund (IMF); United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); United Nations Population Fund
(UNPFA); and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA).
17 With
the demise of the Soviet Union, the wars and rebellions of the Third World
continued. However, they were no longer cast in the ideological frames of
capitalism and communism, so the perception was that in the 1990s the world
became increasingly Balkanised and 'ethnicised'. In fact, of course, this
process began with the breakdown of empires-it was simply mis-diagnosed and
warped to international interests in the era of Cold War politics.
In 1996,
serious internal fighting continued within more than thirty postcolonial
countries, including Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad,
Colombia, Guatemala, Iraq, Kashmir, Lebanon, Liberia, Myanmar, Philippines,
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan and many others.
In 2009,
with the same tensions and confrontations now claimed to be part of the 'war on
terror' by Western countries, serious conflict continues in many non-Western
countries including Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Chad, Djibouti,
Ethiopia, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Mali,
Mauritania, Nepal, Niger, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Tajikistan, Thailand,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Yemen,Colombia, Sudan, Afghanistan, and many
other countries around the world.
18 As Nef
says (1991, p. 13):
... development-along
neo-Keynesian and social democratic lines was perceived as an explicit antidote
to Soviet-type regimes. This fundamental 'orthodoxy' which conceived development
as an alternative to revolution affected most of the subsequent development aid
schemes, whether multilateral or bilateral. The Colombo Plan, President Truman's
Point Four, or later the UN First Development Decade, were imbued with a
reformist, missionary zeal.
19 In
comparison with the literature on 'Third World development', writings on the
involvement of the 'superpowers' in fomenting and sustaining Third World
conflict in the post-Second World War period are sparse. A selection of them
includes: Renner (1994); Chubin (1991); Economist (1994); Elguea (1990); Gareau
(1994); Kick & Kiefer (1987); Makhijani (1992); Neuman (1994); Penny (1992);
De Roux & Chelala (1993); and Nelson, Taylor & Kruger (1983).
20 Anene (1970)
described how African colonial territories were determined:
In the successive phases of
the European partitioning of Africa, the lines demarcating spheres of interest
were often haphazard and precipitately arranged. The European agents and
diplomats were primarily interested in grabbing as much African territory as
possible, and were not unduly concerned about the consequences of disrupting
ethnic groups and undermining the indigenous political order... The manner in
which these boundaries were made was often a subject for after-dinner jokes
among European statesmen. (Anene 1970, p. 3)
21 A brief
selection of texts which address these issues is: Anderson (1991); Arnason
(1990); Brass (1991); Cohen (1991); Cole, Clay & Hill (1990); Eriksen
(1993); Featherstone (1990); Feinberg (1990); Gellner (1983); Hassall (1991);
Held & McGrew (1993); Ihonvbere (1994); James (1994); Lee (1990); Olwig
(1993); Parker, Russo, Sommer & Yaeger (1992); Schiller, Basch & Szanton
(1992); and Wijeyewardene (1990).
22 Many
researchers have consciously set out to identify 'classes' in Third World
nations, and a variety of studies have sought the emergence of the kinds of
classes identified in Western nations. Many more have simply assumed the
relevance of 'class' to the examination of Third World communities.
However, (see History of the Emergence of Capitalism, pp. 94ff.), classes in
Western nations are a consequence of particular historical experiences which
have not been repeated in these non-Western countries. One needs to be very
cautious in applying the concept of 'class' to non-Western
communities.
23 Where such
parties existed they usually symbolised the struggle for independence and
received their legitimacy from that recognition, not from their representation
of the interests of particular 'classes' or espousal of a particular
ideology.
24 This has
proved a problem for many new nations. Indonesia, attempting to do what Murtala
Mohammed (1976, pp. 12-15) claimed was not possible, has tried to deal
with the problem by spelling out a single ideology to which all political
parties must adhere. The Government's aim is to have all Indonesians commit
themselves to these ideals and accept them as fundamental to all public and
political life. It has described its philosophy in the following way:
Pancasila Democracy is a
system of life for the state and society on the basis of people's sovereignty.
It is inspired by the noble values of the Indonesian nation. Pancasila itself,
which means the five principles, is the name given to the foundation of the
Indonesian Republic. The five principles of Pancasila are Belief in the One and
Only God; A Just and civilised humanity; the Unity of Indonesia; Democracy
guided by the inner wisdom of deliberations of representatives; and Social
Justice for all the Indonesian people. (Soetjipto et al. (1995))
25 Which
usually came from First or Second World sources, based on those, not indigenous,
conceptualisations of the world (see History of the Emergence of Capitalism).
26 The issue
of corruption relates, of course, not only to pressures placed on government
departments and personnel to favour particular regions and politicians, but also
to the personalisation of government. Western democratic government emphasises
impersonal and impartial bureaucratic delivery of government services and
administration of expenditure. In most patron-client orientated communities such
impartial and impersonal administration is considered distinctly odd. Government
is inevitably personalised and Western commentators inevitably view that
personalisation as corruption.
27 The
following snippets from discussions reported by the on-line service of Kompas
(Kompas 1996), one the largest circulation newspapers in Indonesia, provides
some insight into the actual relationships between the armed forces, Golkar (the
ruling party) and the other two parties under Suharto's rule. Key terms and
acronyms to understand the following excerpts are:
ABRI:
Indonesian armed forces
Golkar:
ruling party in Indonesia
KIPP:
The Independent Election Monitoring Committee (suggested by PDI and PPP as a
replacement for Panwaslak)
OPP: The
three General Elections Participants Organisation (PPP, PDI, Golkar)
Panwaslak: The Election Monitoring Committee
PDI: The
Indonesian Democratic Party
PPP: The
United Development Party.
Chief of Staff of the Army
General Hartono said it was clear that each member of the armed forces (ABRI)
was a Golkar cadre and therefore persistent questions broaching the issue,
themselves need to be queried. Hartono conveyed his sentiments at the Sabilil
Muttaqien Pesantren (Islamic school) in Magetan, East Java on Thursday (14/3
[1996]) ...
In a meeting with Golkar
officials in the Matesih Square, Central Java, Hartono said ABRI exists behind
Golkar. Historically ABRI has never been separate from Golkar. Every ABRI member
is a Golkar cadre and therefore there is no need for them to be dubious about
stating their allegiance to Golkar (Kompas, 14/3 [1996]) ...
Hassan explained, it is not
true that the existence of KIPP is the expression of all Indonesians. Golkar
with 35 million card-holding members and its 1.5 million cadres can actually be
called as the voice of the majority. 'So the refusal of KIPP is actually the
majority desire. But Golkar does not claim that the people refuses KIPP, Golkar
alone is enough to refuse KIPP,' he said. Regarding to the Initiative Rights
Bill on the Amendment of the General Elections Law proposed by United
Development Party Faction in the House of Representatives, Hassan said, Golkar
refused it not because the present Election Law brings benefit to Golkar. 'No,
the Election Law brings benefit to all OPP. The law has been approved by the
three General Elections Participants Organisation (OPP), so if there should be
any changes in the law, it must be on the approval from the three OPP,' he said
...
The theme for the working
meeting which will be held March 26-28, 1996 is: 'Strengthening the Security
Stability of Regions to ensure the Success of the 1997 General Elections'. The
meeting is aimed at uniting perceptions in the effort to increase development
and preparations for the upcoming elections. Besides all the governors, this
meeting will be attended by the Chairpersons of the Regional House of
Representatives, the First Assistant Secretaries of the Regional Government, the
Heads of the Regional Social Politics Directorate, and the Heads of Regional
Bureau of Governmental Affairs. Soebrata who is also the Secretary of the
General Election Commission said that although governors are the Chairpersons of
the Consultative Board of Golkar and the bureaucratic officials in the regions
are Golkar functionaries, it does not mean that the meeting will discuss efforts
to win Golkar, rather it is an effort by the governors as the Heads of the
Regional Election Committee to execute the General Election successfully,
safely, and orderly.
Asked why the governors'
perceptions have to be unified, the Secretary General said that at present,
there are many disturbing reports that disrupt the preparations of the General
Election, for example, the matter of an independent election monitor al').d
other matters related to the preparation of the General Election. 'Therefore the
unifying of perception among government officials as the administrator of the
General Election concerning the problems that arose,' he said ... Soebrata also
reminded the governors as the officials in charge of the administration of the
General Election in their respective region to implement their functions well
while on duty, meaning that they should not mix up between their functions as
the administrator of the General Election and their role as a Golkar
functionary. 'I think this has been stressed enough, do not mix between the
duties of an administrator of the election and Golkar functionary. While on duty
as the election administrator, he should not campaign. Aside of that, please
campaign,' he said. Soebrata said, until now there are no policies that forbid
the governors to become campaign managers, as it was done in the 1992 General
Election since the period of Minister of Home Affairs Rudini
28 The 1972
American Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T)/CIA conspiracy in Chile, resulting
in the overthrow of an elected but antagonistic government and the emplacement
of a friendly dictatorship is one instance of such activity (see Moberg 1992).
However, similar support for autocratic governments can be found throughout
Central and South America, East and South-East Asia and Africa since the
post-Second World War era.
29 As Rachel
Stohl (2008) describes,
there have been important
changes since the September 11 attacks, with the United States finessing its
arms export policies to support its war on terrorism. The most significant
changes have involved the lifting of sanctions, the increase of arms and
military training provided to perceived anti-terrorist allies, and the
development of new programs focused and based on the global anti-terrorist
crusade. To understand and document this trend, the Center for Defense
Information has analyzed military assistance data (using U.S. government data
solely) for 25 countries 60 that have
been identified by the United States as having a strategic role in the war on
terrorism. These countries include those that reflect the counterterrorism
priorities of the United States—17 are “frontline” states identified by the Bush
administration as “countries that cooperate with the United States in the war on
terrorism or face terrorist threats themselves”—and others strategically located
near Afghanistan and Iraq.
60.
Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Georgia, India,
Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Mauritania, Nepal, Niger, Oman,
Pakistan, Philippines, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and
Yemen
30 See Ahene
& Katz (1992); Bienen & Waterbury (1989); Gamble (1994); Jessop (1988);
and Letwin (1993).
31 Many
commentators seem to have accepted the rhetoric at face value, characterising
the last twenty years as a remarkable period in which many formerly
authoritarian Third World governments turned to democracy. Superficially, the
change from authoritarian to democratic government has been very marked over the
past twenty years. As an FAO report summarised: 'The United Nations reports
that in 1993, elections were held in 45 countries and nearly three quarters of
the world's population now live in countries with democratic and relatively
pluralistic regimes' (UN 1996).
Sadly,
The results of the Economist
Intelligence Unit's (EIU's) Democracy Index (full report and methodology)
confirm that, following a decades-long global trend in democratisation, the
spread of democracy has come to a halt. A comparison of the results for 2008
with those from the first edition of the index, which covered 2006, shows that
the dominant pattern in the past two years has been stagnation.… The Economist, October 29th 2008
Original Citation:
[Revised
and updated 27 November 2009]
Geddes.
B. 1997 'Third World Nations: Global demands, local political realities' in
Geddes B and Crick M. (eds) Global Forces, local realities: Anthropological
perspectives on change in the Third World, Deakin University Press, Geelong,
pp. 11-62 |